Dynamic Optimization

Sample

Bernadette Bouchon-Meunier

This book presents the main tools for aggregation of information given by several members of a group or expressed in multiple criteria, and for fusion of data provided by several sources. It focuses on the case where the availability knowledge is imperfect, which means that uncertainty and/or imprecision must be taken into account. The book contains both theoretical and applied studies of aggregation and fusion methods in the main frameworks: probability theory, evidence theory, fuzzy set and possibility theory. The latter is more developed because it allows to manage both imprecise and uncertain knowledge. Applications to decision-making, image processing, control and classification are described. The reader can find a state-of-the-art of the main methodologies, as well as more advanced results and descriptions of utilizations.

Sample

PierCarlo Nicola

This book presents the contributions of the 20th century to economic theory in a mathematical language and in historical sequence. General equilibrium is the focal point of the book; but also a number of macroeconomic models, especially with respect to the first half of the century, are considered. Dynamic models are extensively studied per se, and not merely as extensions of their static counterparts. The book with its extensive bibliography gives a broad view over the developments in mathematical economics and is therefore an invaluable source of information for researchers and students working in this field.

Sample

George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson

"Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research."--Book cover.

Sample

Atle Seierstad and Knut Sydsæter

This book serves not only as an introduction, but also as an advanced text and reference source in the field of deterministic optimal control systems governed by ordinary differential equations. It also includes an introduction to the classical calculus of variations. An important feature of the book is the inclusion of a large number of examples, in which the theory is applied to a wide variety of economics problems. The presentation of simple models helps illuminate pertinent qualitative and analytic points, useful when confronted with a more complex reality. These models cover: economic growth in both open and closed economies, exploitation of (non- ) renewable resources, pollution control, behaviour of firms, and differential games. A great emphasis on precision pervades the book, setting it apart from the bulk of literature in this area. The rigorous techniques presented should help the reader avoid errors which often recur in the application of control theory within economics.