Mind in a Physical World

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Jaegwon Kim

The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind/body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The second edition features a new chapter on Cartesian substance dualism-a perspective that has been little discussed in the mainstream philosophy of mind and almost entirely ignored in most introductory books in philosophy of mind. In addition, all the chapters have been revised and updated to reflect the trends and developments of the last decade. Throughout the text, Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, the author's own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition. It is a major contribution to the study and teaching of the philosophy of mind.

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Fred Dretske

Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. Dretske's theory of naturalistic representationalism is perhaps the only approach to the study of consciousness that can satisfactorily pin down the slippery first-person aspect of our sensory and affective life. It distinguishes, in wholly naturalistic terms, between what we experience (reality) and how we experience it (appearance). The theory establishes a framework within which subjectivity can be studied objectively, explains the peculiar authority we enjoy about our own mental states, and provides a biologically plausible answer to questions about the function or purpose of consciousness.

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Marc Cortez

The book explores the relationship between Christology and theological anthropology through the lens provided by the theology of Karl Barth and the mind/body discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind. It thus comprises two major sections. The first develops an understanding of Karl Barth's theological anthropology focusing on three major facets: (1) the centrality of Jesus Christ for any real understanding of human persons; (2) the resources that such a christologically determined view of human nature has for engaging in interdisciplinary discourse; and (3) the ontological implications of this approach for understanding the mind/body relationship. The second part draws on this theological foundation to consider the implications that Christological anthropology has for analyzing and assessing several prominent ways of explaining the mind/body relationship. Specifically, it interacts with two broad categories of theories: 'nonreductive' forms of physicalism and 'holistic' forms of dualism. After providing a basic summary of each, the book applies the insights gained from Barth's anthropology to ascertain the extent to which the two approaches may be considered christologically adequate

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John W. Carroll

John W. Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed, he shows that empirically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, and even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation as requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.