Oriental philosophies

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G.W. Leibniz

Offering an invaluable introduction to Leibniz's philosophy, this volume collects many of his most important texts, beginning with the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), which marks the beginning of maturity in his ideas, and ending with the Monadology (1714), which was written in response to requests for a systematic, organized account of his overall philosophy. Also included in this volume are critical reactions to Leibniz's work by his contemporaries (Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Bayle, and Simon Foucher), together with Leibniz's responses. All the texts are newly translated into English for this edition, and each is preceded by a summary explaining its background, structure, and content.

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Bertrand Russell

Russell gives an account of his philosophical development. He describes his Hegelian period and includes hitherto unpublished notes for a Hegelian philosophy of science. He deals next with the two-fold revolution involved with his abandonment of idealism and adoption of a mathematical logic founded upon that of Giuseppe Peano. After two chapters on Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), he passes to the problems of perception as dealt with in Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). In a chapter on ‘The Impact of Wittgenstein’, Russell examines what he now thinks must be accepted and what rejected in that philosopher's work. He notes the changes from earlier theories required by the adoption of William James's view that sensation is not essentially relational and is not per se a form of knowledge. In an explanatory chapter, he endeavours to remove misconceptions of and objections to his theories as to the relation of perception to scientific knowledge. Russell concludes with a reprint of some articles on modern Oxford philosophy.

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[by] Henry B. Veatch

This book critiques contemporary trends in ethical theory, including the deontological tradition dating back to Kant, the teleological tradition of the utilitarians, the analytic movement, and the existentialist-phenomenologist movement. In refuting these trends, Veatch argues that moral and ethical distinctions cannot be rightly or adequately understood if they are regarded simply as matters of linguistic use but are grounded in the very being and nature of things.

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Fred Dretske

Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. Dretske's theory of naturalistic representationalism is perhaps the only approach to the study of consciousness that can satisfactorily pin down the slippery first-person aspect of our sensory and affective life. It distinguishes, in wholly naturalistic terms, between what we experience (reality) and how we experience it (appearance). The theory establishes a framework within which subjectivity can be studied objectively, explains the peculiar authority we enjoy about our own mental states, and provides a biologically plausible answer to questions about the function or purpose of consciousness.