by Maureen Hill and James Alexander (2010)
"From September 1940 until March 1945 German aircraft dropped thousands of bombs on cities throughout the British Isles. The Blitz, as it has become known, was the most devastating aerial bombardment the world had ever seen. These momentous events are recounted here through the archives of the Daily Mail, London Evening Standard, and London Evening News in a detailed visual history."--Jacket.
Leo McKinstry
"Using a wealth of archival and primary source materials, Leo McKinstry provides a groundbreaking new assessment of the six fateful months in mid-1940 when Operation Sea Lion was all that stood between the Nazis and total victory"--
Derek Robinson
Robinson's thesis is that the RAF didn't save Britain from invasion by defeating the Luftwaffe. The battle was at best a draw, and it was the advancing season and Hitler's eyes turning toward Russia that did the job. Robinson also seriously questions whether the Luftwaffe could ever have suppressed the Royal Navy sufficiently to prevent it from making effective night attacks on any invasion fleet and leaving the Germans to totter ashore in no fit state to deal with even a battered British army. Some may object that he overlooks the effect of German air superiority on the Battle of the Atlantic in British waters, yet he points out that Hitler and Goring were totally blind in the area of naval strategy and might not have been able to do anything with such superiority even had they gained it. A solid, well-informed, gentlemanly piece of myth busting and a useful, provocative addition to Battle of Britain literature by the author of one of the outstanding novels on the subject, Piece of Cake (1984).
Leo Kessler
Describes the battle that arose from Eisenhower's abandonment of the race for Berlin and the victory that was accomplished.
Tony Colvin
"Half of the book is a detailed description, mainly told in the words of participants, of three battles fought over four days in the Rhineland south of Goch between 27 February and March 2 1945. The battles were between 3rd Division supported by 6 Guards Armoured Brigade, and 8. Fallschirmjager Division. For the first time the combined actions of over 50,000 men during 96 hours have been analysed from the ground up in an unprecedented attempt to provide understanding of a significant military event. 3 Scots Guards said of Winnekendonk, It is suggested that this will surely rank as one of the finest small scale tank/infantry battles ever executed and well worthy of more close study. The fighting was bloody and heroic, and some controversial aspects are explained for the first time. The other half of the book is an analysis of the units and people involved in the two divisions and their supporting armour and aviation. An answer is provided as to why only two months before the end of hostilities, 21 Army Group could manage only quite slow and costly progress. The answer comes from the analysis, and is tested through comparison with the contemporary Canadian Operation Blockbuster, and with two battles in the Hitler Line. Evidence is provided that there is no truth to recent claims that Montgomery's generalship was efficient and saved lives. Instead, it is shown that the military hierarchy, including Churchill, ignored the all-arms operational methodology under unitary command which Sir John Monash had developed to bring victory in 1918. In the Second World War, by contrast, the Royal Armoured Corps and 2 TAF never integrated with the infantry and artillery, and were never suitably equipped, being bound to the cultic pursuit of mobility. General Elles required that the Infantry Tank be immune to all German anti-tank guns, and his Matilda II was a major reason for the deliverance from Dunkirk and for the success of Operation Compass in North Africa. Compared with the Hundred Days of 1918, the author suggests that the British Armed forces in 1945 were relatively less efficient in all respects except that of killing German civilians in area bombing. This book's fully documented and researched conclusions provide a new and controversial interpretation of 21 Army Group." --Publisher description.