by William Stueck (1995)
This first truly international history of the Korean War argues that its timing, its course, and its outcome made it in effect a substitute for World War III. Stueck draws on recently available materials from seven countries, plus the archives of the United Nations, presenting a detailed narrative of the diplomacy of the conflict and a broad assessment of its critical role in the Cold War. In Stueck's view, contributors to the UN cause in Korea provided support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of collective security but because they saw an opportunity to influence U.S. policy. At the moment of Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950, as in other instances prior to the armistice in July 1953, NATO allies and Third World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism and so in blocking the spread of hostilities to other parts of the world. While conceding the tragic and brutal nature of the war, Stueck suggests that it helped to prevent the occurrence of an even more destructive conflict in Europe.
Robert K. Schaeffer
Contents: Change and the modern world -- The world after World War II -- Dollar devaluations -- Fighting inflation -- Debt and taxes in the Third World -- Debt and taxes in the United States -- Stock market and job loss -- Technology, food, and hunger -- Free trade agreements -- Population growth -- Global climate change -- Dictatorship and democracy -- The spread of separatism -- Mafias and the global drug trade.
Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael
"This volume seeks to explore the impact of the Gulf War on the fashioning of a new world order, with particular reference to the role of the Middle East region. It is divided into four parts, each addressing a different facet. The purpose is to develop a holistic perspective of the new world order and to explore its external and internal dynamics. What is revealed is that the processes of policy articulation, formulation, and impact are interactively interrelated rather than sequentially related and dynamic rather than static vis-à̀-vis the relationship between objectives and outcomes"--Page 1.
Arthur Stam
"The New Order was the term the Japanese, German and Italian governments used for their expansive strategies and spheres of influence during the eve and course of the Second World War. Their attack against the status quo was initiated by Japan occupying Mandchuria, preceding Hitler's rise to power. Subsequently Italian agression against Ethiopia shows that the first military adventures of the emerging New Order occurred outside Europe. A main issue in this account is the lack of coordination between the German and Japanese approaches towards the USSR. Consequently the Anti-Komintern-Pact, an overwhelmingly ideological cover-up, implied meagre strategic significance. The Tripartite Treaty, on the contrary, provided Germany with some East European allies in its warfare against the USSR. In contrast to Germany and Japan the Italian military performance was in all the stages of the second World War so poor, that Mussolini's Fascism was downgraded to a humiliating position within the New Order. The author concludes that the common strategy came to naught on different interests and mentalities. Fascist "internationalism" proved to be a sheer impossibility."--BOOK JACKET.
Steven Hugh Lee
"Following World War II the United States, determined to prevent the extension of Soviet and Communist Chinese influence, took the lead in organizing the defence of Western interests in Asia. In Outposts of Empire Steven Lee explores the foreign policy objectives of the United States, as well as those of Great Britain and Canada, and examines the role that economic and military aid played in their attempts to establish pro-Western, anti-Communist governments on the periphery of Communist East Asia.". "Drawing on a wide range of recently declassified documents, Lee outlines the regional and international context of American diplomatic relations with Korea and Vietnam and analyses the relationship between containment, the bipolar international system, and American and European concepts of empire at the beginning of the era of decolonization. He argues that although policy makers in the United Kingdom and Canada adopted a more defensive containment policy toward Communist China than the United States did, they generally supported American attempts to promote pro-Western elites in Korea and Vietnam."--BOOK JACKET.