Die Seele: Metapher oder Wirklichkeit?

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Peter Nickl, Georgios Terizakis (Hg

Verlagsinfo: Die Seele - die tiefen Verstrickungen dieses Begriffs in metaphysische Traditionen haben ihn für lange Zeit in den Archiven der Philosophie verschwinden lassen und dem Vergessen übergeben. Wie können Philosophen heute aber über die Seele sprechen? Der Band stellt renommierte Autoren und Denker vor diese Herausforderung. Hinderk Emrich, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Robert Spaemann, Franco Volpi und andere zeigen, dass Philosophie heute lebendiges Denken zwischen Metapher und Wirklichkeit sein kann, das selbst vor der Seele keine Angst zu haben braucht

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Paul Ricoeur

Paul Ricoeur is widely regarded as one of the most distinguished philosophers of our time. In The Rule of Metaphor this intellectual giant of our age seeks 'to show how language can extend itself to its very limits, forever discovering new resonances within itself'. Recognizing the fundamental power of language in constructing the world we perceive, Ricoeur reveals the processes by which linguistic imagination creates and recreates meaning through metaphor. Taking further his acclaimed analysis of the power of myth and symbol, Ricoeur invites us to explore the many layers of language in order to rediscover what that meaning might be. A fruitful and insightful study of how language affects how we understand the world, this book is also an indispensable work for all those seeking to retrieve some kind of meaning in uncertain times.

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George A. Panichas

The immediate and guiding aim of this book is to introduce the contemporary reader to the work and thought of Simone Weil.

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Jaegwon Kim

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind - in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction.